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MACKAY: ADVOCACY SKILLS 
Every profession seeks to improve the quality of service 
that it provides. An important consequence of high quality 
service is gaining the trust and confidence of the consumer. 
Thus, a company that produces a high quality product or service 
has a better chance of profiting and surviving than a company 
without such quality. 
The legal profession is no exception to this Darwinian rule 
of economics. For instance, John Sonnett's list of clients was 
undoubtedly bolstered by his reputation as an excellent advocate 
and devoted public servant. However, certain characteristics of 
the legal profession prevent it from conducting its operations in 
a purely capitalistic manner. Lawyers provide an exclusive 
service that no one else in the professional arena is licensed to 
provide. The legal factory produces neither cars nor widgets. 
Instead, it provides a mechanism that assists the public in 
ensuring that its rights are not violated. The seeker of legal 
services is a consumer by necessity, aiming to rectify an aspect 
of his or her life. 
When an attorney performs insufficiently, society as a whole 
suffers. Fair administration of justice requires the 
availability of competent lawyers for all members of society. 
Both the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Model Code 
of Professional Responsibility provide that all lawyers have a 
responsibility to provide legal services for those unable to pay. 
If all of the quality attorneys charge $250 per hour, then a 
major sector of society will be denied competent legal 
, 
representation. As a result, these less fortunate members will 
be unable to ensure that their rights can be protected. In 
recent years we have seen upper echelon members of society hire 
brilliant legal minds to represent them and avoid punishment. 
Klaus Von Bulow's murder trial and the William Kennedy Smith rape 
trial are some examples. In the years to come, the legal 
profession would undoubtedly like to see that such competent 
advocacy be given to lesser fortunate members of society. 
The need for competent advocacy is not only an American 
problem, but it is a concern for every legal system across the 
globe. In the following lecture, Lord Chancellor Mackay presents 
a British perspective on the importance of developing and 
maintaining superior advocacy skills. Lord Mackay advances the 
notion that improved advocacy is essential t o the protection and 
preservation of the legal rights of all persons. 
JOHN F SONNETT LECTURE 3 APRIL 1991 
THE ADVOCATE SHOULD HE SPEAK OR WRITE? 
Introduction 
1. Dean, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen. I am both 
pleased and honoured to be here in New York tonight to give 
the 20th Annual John F Sennett Lecture at Fordham University 
School of Law. The list of previous lecturers is indeed a 
distinguished one, including as it does former Chief 
Justices of Ireland and England as well as your own Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court, Warren E Burger and other 
distinguished American judges and lawyers. 
2. John F Sennett, as most of you here will know better than 
I, had a distinguished career in the law, both in public and 
private service. He was Assistant Attorney General and 
Chief of the Antitrust Division of the United States 
Department of Justice before returning to private practice 
and establishing an international reputation for trial and 
appellate advocacy. He was a graduate of the School of Law 
at Fordham University. The University itself was founded 
in 1841 and thus celebrates its One Hundred and Fiftieth 
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Anniversary this year. The Law School is, however, a little 
younger, having been founded in 1905. It has developed to 
provide a wide ranging circulation and has produced a number 
of distinguished graduates. 
3. When I received the invitation to give this lecture, the 
only indication I received as to its subject was that it 
should be "advocacy - related." After some reflection, I 
have chosen the title "The Advocate : should he speak or 
write?" My choice of subject owes much to Professor Robert 
Martineau of the University of Cincinnati, to Professor 
Michael Zander of the London School of Economics and to the 
heavy snow we experienced in London earlier this year. The 
connections between the three, I am sure, will not be 
immediately obvious to you. Owing to the very heavy snow, 
I spent rather longer than planned one Friday both sitting 
in the airport lounge and on the plane, waiting for take-
off. This provided the opportunity for a more thorough 
perusal of the daily press than time usually permits. One 
of the articles I read with great interest was a review by 
Michael Zander of a book by Professor Martineau called 
"Appellate Justice in England and the United States: A 
Comparative Analysis". Professor Zander wrote of Professor 
Martineau's conclusion that the problems of dealing with 
high workloads and growing backlog, experienced by appellate 
courts in both England and Wales and the USA, were more 
easily tackled in the USA because of the use of written 
briefs supplemented by minimal oral advocacy. This set me 
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thinking about the use of oral or written advocacy in all 
our courts and if there were conclusive reasons for adopting 
one rather than the other. I decided to examine this by 
using examples from England and Wales, from Scotland and 
from USA. 
4. A number of people have helped me with this lecture. I have 
already mentioned the indirect help of Professor Martineau 
and I have had the opportunity of discussing with Professor 
Zander his article. I am also indebted to Lord Griffiths, 
Lord Donaldson, Master of the Rolls, Professor Ian Scott of 
the University of Birmingham and James Wolffe, the Legal 
Assistant to the Lord President of the Court of Session and, 
above all, to my Private Secretary, Jenny Rowe. 
Responsibility for any errors of weaknesses in the lecture 
, is, however, entirely mine. 
It was Francis Bacon who said "Reading maketh a full man; 
1 conference a readyman; and writing an exact man". 
5. The English tradition however is one of predominantly oral 
advocacy. al though, the English dictionary to which I 
referred defined an advocate as: 
"A person who pleads on behalf of another, especially 
in a court of law; a person who speaks or writes in 
support of some cause, argument of proposal." 
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Although the dictionary definition allows for advocacy to 
be either written or spoken, few people in the English 
tradition, until comparatively recently, would have laid 
much emphasis on the art of written advocacy. Lord Birkett, 
in his Presidential Address to the Holdsworth Club in 
......._. u_,'vc.r~ o..f 
£Birmingham in 1956, defined the advocate's art in a way 
which clearly assumed an advocacy that was exclusively oral: 
" It is clear that advocacy is made up of many 
elements. There is first of all, [I repeat], the 
importance of the advocate himself. He should count 
himself exceedingly fortunate if he has been endowed 
with a good voice. But he must use it. He must speak 
so that he can be heard, and he must articulate 
clearly. He must try to acquire tone and modulation, 
so that his every sentence is pleasant to the ear. To 
the advocate, the spoken word is the breath of his 
life, and it is quite astonishing to me that so little 
thought is given to it ...• A commanding presence is 
a great asset, but if nature has been careless about 
this, the advocate must do the best he can by making 
up for it in other directions •••. It is well if the 
advocate is posed of a quick mind, alert to seize the 
unexpected opportunity, to adapt himself to the sudden 
changes which occur in the conduct of a case, and to 
be ready to deal with any interventions from the Bench, 
whether they be disconcerting or helpful. But more 
important than the quick mind is the understanding 
4 
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heart, the insight into human nature, the natural 
sympathy with all sorts and conditions of men, the 
intuitive recognition of what the particular situation 
demands .... But whether the advocate possessed all 
or any of these qualities, there are certain desirable 
things which it is in the power of all advocates to do 
In the conduct of any case the advocate must have 
made himself master of all the facts; he must have a 
thorough understanding of the principles and rules of 
law which are applicable to the case and the ability 
to apply them on the instant; he must gauge with 
accuracy the atmosphere of the court in which he pleads 
and adapt himself accordingly; I he must be able to 
reason from the facts and the law to achieve the end 
he desires, and he must above all have mastered the art 
of expressing himself clearly and persuasively in 
acceptable English." 
I learnt my advocacy principally at the Scottish Bar. In 
my view, the best training for oral advocacy is to appear 
before a really good, well controlled cour • presided over 
by judges of high calibre. I was very fortunate in this 
respect, when I went to the Bar there was a great deal of 
rating work available. It was conducted, at first instance, 
before local committees of lay men and there was an appeal, 
from these local committes, to the Lands Valuation Appeal 
Court. This consisted of three Judges, two from the Inner 
House of the Court of Session, which as I shall explain 
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later is the appellate part of that Court, and the third the 
senior Judge of the Outer House, the first instance section 
of the Court. All three were Judges of acute mind, rigorous 
legal intellect and a courtesy that was most encouraging to 
those who were prepared and devastating to the unprepared. 
Because of their intellectual rigour their judgements were 
highly consistent and it was, therefore, possible for a 
young advocate, as I was, to forecast with remarkable 
precision what the result of any particular appeal would be. 
This gave one reputation and confidence. I found myself 
appearing before them a great deal and I believe their 
testing of my preparation and of the logic of my argument 
helped me greatly to develop a style, at least for appellate 
work, which was much better than I could have attained 
without their help. 
General Principle of Aavocacy 
7. But it is also possible to learn about advocacy from the 
written experience and analysis of others. I am somewhat 
indebted to two notable practitioners of the art of 
advocacy, first Frederic Wrottesley, latterly a Lord Justice 
of Appeal, in his book "The Examination of Witnesses in 
Court" and Munkman in his book "The Technique of Advocacy". 
Both books are ones to which I ref erred frequently during 
my early time at the Bar, and they are still valuable guides 
to any advocate. 
6 
8. Munkman takes a similar line to Birkett. Wrottesley writes 
from the point of view of a specialist in civil rather than 
criminal matters the first quarter of this Century, when 
most civil trials in England still took place before a jury. 
Some of his comments may, therefore, with due allowance for 
passage of time, be particularly relevant to an American 
audience. Wrottesley makes his own personal view of the 
strengths of oral advocacy very plain at an early stage: 
"No better mode of ascertaining the truth of a past 
transaction will probably ever be devised by human 
ingenuity than the present methods of viva voce 
examination of witnesses, conducted as it is in open 
Court, in the sight of the public and in the presence 
of the parties, their counsel, and of the Judge and 
jury, who all have an opportunity of observing the 
intelligence, demeanour, inclination, bias or prejudice 
of the witnesses. In this way every man is given a 
fair and impartial trial, and his rights cannot be a 
bridged nor may he be deprived of the inevitable 
blessings of life, liberty, or property, without the 
concurrence of Judge and jury." 
9. Wrottesley then goes on to set out what might be described 
as a plan of attack for the advocate, which is very similar 
to the technique propounded by Munkman. Counsel must first 
take great care in the introduction of his evidence; 
ensuring that any documentary evidence is proved and that 
7 
he takes every lawful advantage of his adversary to ensure 
that documents are disclosed. 
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advocate should, in nearly every case, put his most 
intelligent and honest witness in the box first. This 
allows him to make as good an impression as possible upon 
the Court and jury at the earliest possible moment. 
Furthermore, because that witness is likely to have to 
undergo the sharpest cross-examination, it is important 
that he be well able to cope with it. If the first witness 
is weak, he may do incalculable harm to the advocate' s 
client. Witnesses should then be introduced in a logical 
and sequential manner, so that evidence on a particular 
subject is introduced as a whole, rather than in a 
fragmented fashion. It is also suggested that a strong 
witness be retained until the end of the case, once again 
to increase the impact upon the Court and jury. Whilst the 
theory is sensible, this does assume you have sufficient 
witnesses to organise them in this way. 
11. Wrottesley states what may be a self evident truth, 
certainly for oral advocacy, that; "no lawyer can be 
successful in the highest sense of the term unless he is 
a master of the difficult art of examining witnesses. It 
requires a greater combination of qualities than almost any 
other branch of advocacy, the most important of which are 
patience, coolness, courage and tact." He goes on to say 
8 
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that it is difficult to lay down any rules which would 
govern this, but that certain precepts can be gained from 
the writings of others on this sub'ect. Wrottesley gives 
in full the 11 golden rules set out by the American 
attorney, David Paul Brown. I think I can do no better than 
he by quoting those rules in full. 
First. If your own witnesses are bold, and may injure your 
cause by pertness or forwardness, observe a ceremony and 
gravity of manner towards them which may be calculated to 
repress their assurance. 
Second. If they are alarmed or diffident and their thoughts 
are evidently scattered, commence your examination with 
matters of a familiar character, remotely connected with the 
subject of their alarm, or the matter in issue, as for 
instance: "Where do you live?" "Do you know the parties?" 
"How long have you known them?" and the like. When you have 
restored them to composure, and the mind has gained its 
equilibrium, proceed to the most essential features of the 
cause being careful to be mild and distinct in your 
approaches, lest you may trouble the fountain again from 
which you are to drink. 
Third. If the evidence of your own witnesses be 
unfavourable to you - which should always be guarded against 
- exhibit no want of composure: for there are many minds 
that form opinions of the nature or character of testimony 
9 
chiefly from the effect which it may appear to produce upon 
the counsel. 
Fourth. If you see that the mind of the witness is imbued 
with prejudices against your client, hope but little from 
such a quarter - unless there be some facts which are 
essential to your client's protection, and which that 
witness alone can prove; either do not call him, or get rid 
of him as soon as possible. If the opposite counsel see the 
bias to which I referred he may employ it to your own ruin. 
In judicial inquiries, of all possible evils the worst and 
the hardest to resist is an enemy in the disguise of a 
friend. You cannot impeach him - you cannot disarm him -
you cannot even indirectly assail him; and if you exercise 
the only privilege that is left to you, and call other 
witnesses for the purpose of an explanation, you must bear 
in mind that instead of carrying the war into the enemy's 
country, the struggle is between sections of your own 
forces, and in the very heart, perhaps, of your own camp. 
Avoid this by all means. 
Fifth. Never call a witness whom your adversary will be 
compelled to call. This will afford you the privilege of 
cross-examination. Take from your opponent the small 
privilege it thus gives you, and, in addition thereto, not 
only render everything unfavourable said by the witness 
doubly operative against the party calling him, but also 
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deprive that party of the power of counteracting the effect 
of the testimony . 
Sixth. Never ask a question without an object - nor without 
being able to connect that object with the case if objected 
to as irrelevant. 
Seventh. Be careful not to put your questions in such form 
that, if opposed for informality, you cannot sustain it, or 
at least produce strong reasons in its support. Frequently 
failures in the discussion of points of evidence enfeeble 
your strength in the estimation of the jury, and greatly 
impair your hopes in the final result. 
Eighth. Never object to a question put by your adversary 
without being able and disposed to enforce the objection. 
Nothing is so monstrous as to be constantly making and 
withdrawing objections; it indicates either a want of 
correct perception in making them, or a deficiency of 
reason, or of moral courage in not making them good. 
Ninth. Speak to your witness clearly and distinctly, as if 
you were awake, and engage in a matter of interest, and make 
him, also, speak distinctly and to your question. How can 
it be supposed that the Court and jury will be inclined to 
listen, when the only struggle seems to be whether the 
counsel or the witness shall first go to sleep? 
11 
Tenth. Modulate your voice as circumstances may direct. 
"Inspire the fearful and repress the bold." 
Eleventh. Never begin before you are ready, and always 
finish when you have done. In other words, do not question 
for question's sake - but for an answer. 
12. I see no reason to dissent from any of these rules except 
for the fifth. In my time as an advocate, I have disobeyed 
that rule, so as to give myself two opportunities to 
question a witness. The initial examination of an 
unsuspecting witness can prove an invaluable means of 
eliciting information the witness may be reluctant to give, 
leaving the Jury to draw its own conclusion. 
13. The sixth rule, "never ask a question without an object", 
is of absolutely vital importance. This includes care in 
choosing the right words and the emphasis you give to the 
words you have chosen, so that the answers you receive do 
little damage, and as much good, as possible to the case you 
are presenting. Munkman takes two admirable examples from 
the Arran murder case where Graham Murray (later Viscount 
Dunedin) was examining for the prosecution: 
The body of a man had been found on a mountainside, and his 
companion was charged with murdering him. The defence were 
suggesting (among other things) that the place was dangerous 
and death might have been caused by an accidental fall. 
12 
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Graham Murray - "Was there anything in the character of the 
ground which would make it specially dangerous?" - "No." 
Later in the same case it appeared that the police, for some 
mysterious reason had not kept the boots of the dead man, 
and the defence used this to raise vague suspicions. Graham 
Murray, examining a police witness said to him: 
"It seems that you afterwards buried a pair of boots that 
were on the body?". - "Yes, on the seashore at Corrie". 
14. In each case the introduction of a single word; "specially" 
and "seems," has a very important effect. Without 
"specially", the answer received would have been completely 
the opposite. The introduction of the word "seems" in the 
second example, tended to undermine the idea that it was a 
15. Of course, while the skilled advocate is putting all of 
these principles into practice his opponent should not be 
idle. He should pay close attention to the questions put 
by his opponent and the answers they elicit. He should 
ensure that each question is properly put, according to the 
rules of evidence and also endeavour to see what its bearing 
is on the case and the unfolding plan of his opponent. He 
is well advised, as we have seen in the 11 golden rules, 
against the making of unnecessary interventions and 
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injections during examination in chief. But an objection p~.Jf~ 
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the right place can seriously weaken your opponents cas~ ~ 
as Wrottesley says: 
"If you watch closely the examination of witness, in 
a trial where an experienced advocate is on the one 
side and an inexperienced one on the other, you will 
see the practiced man putting question after question 
and eliciting facts most damaging to the other side 
which his adversary might have shut out by a prompt 
objection to them, but which it permits to pass without 
protest ... " 
16. Does the technique vary on cross-examination? Sir James 
Scarlet once said of a Mr Topping, an eminent leader on his 
Circuit that his idea of cross-examination was putting over 
again every questions asked in chief in a very angry tone. 
That is, perhaps, a fault from which advocates are not 
entirely free even today. Courts and juries may be apt to 
give credit to an advocate for delicacy of feeling in cross-
examination; a jury is apt to sympathise with a witness who 
is unjustly attacked and their verdict may unconsciously be 
influenced by the impression gained. 
17. There are four aims for cross-examination; the first is to 
obtain some new information which will be helpful to the 
party cross-examining, the second is to destroy the material 
parts of the evidence in chief; the third is to weaken the 
14 
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evidence, where it cannot be destroyed; and the fourth is 
to undermine the witness, or shake his credit by showing 
that he cannot be trusted to tell the truth or that he is 
speaking of matters of which he has no real knowledge. 
Wrottesley further suggests that the advocate has two 
courses open to him in cross-examining a witness. He may 
however demonstrate his distrust of the witness by his 
manner, look or tone of voice or he may examine him as 
though he thought him an honest witness. Both courses have 
their advantages in different circumstances and whichever 
is adopted may very well depend upon the circumstances of 
the case. The witness who is patently not believed by 
Counsel may well lose credit with the Judge or jury, while 
the witness that who thinks that he has been believed may 
well become careless and reveal inconsistencies in his 
testimony. I always found the most sensible course was not 
to betray to the witness anything about my own feelings. 
The experienced cross-examiner should not take the 
statements of honest witnesses for granted but investigate 
them thoroughly and endeavour to show that they are mistaken 
as to what they think they heard or saw and seek to show 
that the witness who is genuinely saying what he believes 
he saw or heard cannot be relied upon because of the 
surrounding testimony or the inherent unreasonableness of 
his story. The simple fact that a witness is honest, does 
not mean that you cannot qualify his evidence. 
15 
18. A young advocate, wishing to learn about cross-examination, 
can do little better than look at examples such as the 
cross-examination of Oscar Wilde by Sir Edward Carson. 
19. Carson had evidence of Wilde's books, some of which might 
convey immoral implications; personal letters; and actual 
association with a series of young men for immoral purposes. 
He set out his facts in that order but by way of an opening 
gambit confronted Wilde with facts which proved him to be 
a liar at the very start. 
"You stated that your age was 39. I think you are over 40. 
You were born on 16 October 1854?" 
"I have no wish to pose as being young. I am 39 or 40. You 
have my certificate and that settles the matter." 
"But being in 1854 makes you more than 40?" 
"Ah! very well. 
20. Carson then went on to examine specific passages from 
various of Wilde's works. Wilde defended himself by stating 
that none of the passages had ~ personal relevance. Carson 
now brought to bear private letters addressed to Lord Alfred 
Douglas which expressed sentiments of great affection. 
Wilde was forced to admit that this represented "a tender 
expression of my great admiration for Lord Alfred Douglas. 
16 
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It was not, like the other, a prose poem." Having gradually 
backed Wilde away from his originally detached position 
Carson then delivered the final blow questioning Wilde about 
this relationship with a young man called Walter Grainger: 
"Did you ever kiss him?" "Oh, dear no ..• He was, 
unfortunately, extremely ugly ... " 
"Was that the reason why you did not kiss him?" - "Oh, 
Mr Carson, you are pertinently insolent." 
"Did you say that in support of your statement that you 
never kissed him?" - "No. It is a childish question ••• " 
"Why did you mention his ugliness?" - "It is ridiculous to 
imagine that any such thing could have occurred under any 
circumstances." 
"Then why did you mention his ugliness, I ask you?" 
"Perhaps because you insulted me by an insulting question." 
"Was that a reason why you should say the boy was ugly?" 
21. At this point Wilde became inarticulate and unable to 
answer. This is a classic example of a confrontational 
technique of cross-examination destroying both the opposing 
side's case and the witness's credibility. Nevertheless, 
~n advocate should never become an instrument of vengeance 
17 
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at the hands of his client. An injudicious attack upon a 
witness may well harm an advocate's case. Understatement 
is a wise thing. If the advocate allows his professional 
judgment to be overruled by that of his client then he will 
lose the power to direct both the cross-examination and the 
case in the most suitable way. J There is, however, perhaps 
more difficulty in deciding whether or not the character or 
past history of a witness should be attacked. Wrottesley 
strongly advises against this, saying that someone who is 
trying to live an honest life now should not have their 
offences brought back to them, but I am sure that many of 
you will recall cases where the strongest point of your own 
argument has been the unreliability of a hostile witness, 
as demonstrated by his past history. 
Slightly different considerations may · come into play when 
cross-examining an expert witness. In the Arran murder case 
we can find a very good example of a so-called expert 
witness being readily discredited. Cosimo Latona had stated 
that he was a "guide" in the Arran mountains and that the 
place where the body was found was a dangerous one: this 
was to support the defence theory that the dead man might 
have slipped accidentally. Graham Murray asked these 
questions: 
"How long have you been in Arran?" - "About three years." 
18 
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"Are you a fisherman by trade?" - "Yes, a fisherman in the 
winter." 
"How many times have you guided people over the hills in 
Arran?" - "I did not guide any people until the body of Rose 
was found." 
"Had you ever been in Glen Sannox at all before Rose's body 
was found?" - "No." 
Nowadays such a witness is likely to be more than well 
qualified and to be fully in control of the evidence he 
presents. 
23. The examples I have used so far, suggest that advocacy 
should always be spoken. But it would not be correct to 
assume the answer to my question is clear. It is true that 
I have spent my career working with two traditions of 
predominantly oral advocacy Scotland and England and 
Wales. Two points are, however, particularly noteworthy. 
One is that the Scottish tradition of oral advocacy is 
rather more recent than you might think. The other is that 
in England and Wales, much greater use has been made of 
written advocacy in a variety of different courts in recent 
years. 
Scotland 
19 
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24. For part of the nineteenth century written arguments, known 
as cases or minutes of debate were extensively used in the 
Scottish Courts. For Court of Session actions, prior to 
1825, parties supported their cases by extensive written 
memorials on both fact and law. It was open to parties at 
anytime in the progress of a case to introduce new issues 
of fact or law. ! A description of this practice appears in 
Lord Cockburn's journal for 26 May 1846 : 
"No modern can comprehend the lives of the well-
employed "writing counsel" of the last generation. 
when every statement, every argument, every 
application, every motion was made in writing, and 
every party was always entitled to give in a written 
answer; eight out of every twelve hours of the lives 
of these men were spent over ink-stands. What tons of 
discussion - especially as no case in those days was 
ever done. Everything could be stated and re-stated 
till the client was fairly bankrupt or dead. There was 
always one excellent stock paper on each side, composed 
or revised by the best hand engaged. It was to this 
practice of good professional composition that the 
literature which has ever distinguished the law of 
Scotland was very much owing. Indeed, it has been 
thought that our old practice made better lawyers than 
can ever be made by oral discussion. When well done, 
writing seems to have the advantage of inducing greater 
care. Men don't boggle at speaking nonsense which they 
20 
would hesitate to put permanently down upon paper. But 
spoken words are shorter, and the judges cannot escape 
from hearing them." 
You might care to reflect on this quotation in the light of 
the words I quoted earlier from Francis Bacon. 
25. The Judicature Act of 1825 changed the form of pleading, by 
requiring parties to distinguish statements of fact from 
pleas in law, and to bind the parties to a particular 
statement of facts. The Act also sought to substitute so 
far as possible oral for written argument. Some written 
argument was, however, retained. It was possible to prepare 
"cases in writing" consisting of a copy of the record, and 
a separate argument in respect of each plea in law. Such 
"cases" could be required at a number of stages in an 
action: 
(a) by the Lord Ordinary before deciding a question of 
relevancy before or after a proof or jury trial 
(section 16); 
(a) by the Lord Ordinary on reporting a case to the Inner 
House (section 20); or 
(b) by the Inner house itself (sect~on 18). 
The affect of the changes from written to oral pleadings on 
Outer House and Inner House seems to have differed. Before 
21 
I proceed to outline this, it might be helpful if I explain 
a little about the Outer and Inner House. The Court of 
Session is a Collegiate Court, where cases at first instance 
are heard by a single judge in the Outer House, so called 
because of its physical position. An appeal, described as 
"a reclaiming motion" went to the Inner House, who either 
"adhered to" or "departed from" the original judgement. 
26. In the Outer House, al though it appears that cases were 
usually ordered in all matters of "intricacy or difficulty" 
(Bell's Dictionary 1838 sub voce 'Case') the Lord Ordinary 
would nonetheless hear a full oral debate in addition. In 
the Inner House, by contrast, full "hearings in presence" 
were apparently relatively rare, and discussion would be 
limited to "a few minutes", it being assumed that the judges 
had read the written arguments (Bell's Dictionary 1838 sub 
voce 'Hearing in Presence'). Indeed when a Parliamentary 
Select Committee reported on the Scottish Supreme Courts in 
1840 (P.P. 1840 (322 XIV.l), it found that the judges of the 
Inner House sat in court for only approximately 2 hours each 
day, spending the remainder of the time (presumably) reading 
and writing. 
27. As an alternative to ordering cases, the Inner House 
apparently, where points of difficulty were raised in 
argument, would sometimes appoint parties to prepare and 
I lodge ''minutes of debate", containing arguments on the point 
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in dispute. This practice is referred to in editions of 
Bell's Dictionary from 1838 to 1890 (sub voce 'Minute'). 
28. The use of written debate was not confined to the Court of 
Session. For a short period in the nineteenth century, when 
in a Sheriff Court (the lower court in Scotland) proof was 
concluded, the Sheriff could order minutes of debate or 
memorials on the proof or on the whole case before giving 
his decisions (Act of Sederunt 12 November 1825). This 
power was removed by the Sheriff Courts Act 1853 section 12. 
29. During the course of the nineteenth century, various attacks 
were made on the use of written argument so that it fell 
largely into desuetude before formal repeal. I Examples of 
the arguments used are: 
(I) As early as 1787 a prescient anonymous pamphlet 
entitled "Suggestions for some Reformations in the Form 
of Process in the Court of Session" stated that: "[b]y 
argument at the Bar, the counsel on the different sides 
winnow the cause from all sort of chaff. Being face 
to face, untenable points and random allegations are 
of course laid aside: they not only satisfy the judge, 
but frequently convince one another; so that the judge 
is often enabled to decide upon the hearing alone; and 
should he think it necessary to order the arguments to 
be stated in writing the different matters and 
arguments upon which the cause rests are so well 
23 
--.; 
-~ .i 
understood by both sides that the writing may be stated 
in very small compass, leaving out all that is not in 
point, or not to the purpose". 
(II) In an anonymous article in the Scots Magazine for 1825, 
a commentator on the 1825 Act suggested that all 
arguments should be oral and that there should be no 
provision for written cases. He suggested that this 
would save about £60 to each party "and much trouble 
would also be saved to the judges". 
(III )The Parliamentary Select Committee mentioned above 
compared the practice in the Outer House and Inner 
House already described. It reported general 
satisfaction with the use of cases in the Outer House, 
~r\~ 
but considerable dissatisfaction in~ quarters with 
the practice of the Inner House. The report states 
that "the advantages of a full viva voce discussion ... 
the Committee think it unnecessary to dwell upon" . 
Among other advantages they mention the following: 
(a) litigants have confidence that the judges have given 
full and impartial attention to their cases; 
(b) private study of the papers is rendered more useful by 
previous oral argument; and 
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( c) litigants can be sure that no important aspect of their 
cases has been overlooked. 
30. It does seem very clear that the move from a system based 
. on written pleadings in the eighteenth century to a system 
based on oral pleadings by the close of the nineteenth 
century was consciously modelled on procedure in the English 
courts. 
England and Wales 
31. In England and Wales it is probably, in the field of civil 
appeals, that the most significant moves have been made 
towards the use of written advocacy. This was largely in 
response to an ever increasing workload, with the 
consequential problem of delay and growing backlogs. The 
current Master of the Rolls, Lord Donaldson, has since 1982 
introduced a number of changes to the handling of appeals. 
These include the reading of appeal papers by judges in 
advance of a hearing, the filing of skeleton arguments and 
the filing of a chronology of events setting out the basic 
facts of a case. This enables the advocate in a civil 
appeal to dispense with a recitation of facts and move 
straight to the ground of appeal. 
32. The Commercial Court has been able to reduce delays in 
hearing cases, partly as a result of an additional judge and 
partly through a new and more flexible approach to listing 
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procedures. In March 1990 the second edition of the "Guide 
to Commercial Court Practice" was published. The 
Introduction to the Guide states: 
"It is the policy of the court that in principle the 
trial or other hearing should take place at the 
earliest date . that the parties can be ready". 
The essence of this new approach is to ensure that the 
parties and the court are as fully informed as possible at 
the summons for directions stage about what is involved in 
a particular case with the aim that no dispute should be 
delayed in its resolution by reasons over which the court 
has control. This involves the early exchange of written 
information and the development of skeleton arguments. The 
overall result has been a significant reduction in the 
length of trials so that during the Whitsun and Trinity 
terms 1990 over 50% of cases took between 1 and 2 days and 
over 86% took less than 8 days. 
33. In the English courts, both civil and criminal, first 
instance and appellate, the oral tradition has remained 
strong. But the door has been opened, in recent years, to 
the use of written argument. My distinguished predecessor, 
Lord Hailsham, set in hand a review of civil justice in 
response to the growing complexity and cost of the civil 
justice system in England and Wales. Amongst the 
recommendations of this review, which I will be introducing 
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to the county courts, in July, is the pre-trial exchange of 
witness statements. The aim is to provide a sound basis for 
earlier, better informed settlements in appropriate cases, 
improve pre-trial preparation and shorten trials by helping 
to identify issues and reduce the need for lengthy oral 
evidence. This procedure was introduced into some parts of 
the High Court in 1986 and extended to the remainder in 
1988 . 
America 
34. I have, so far looked at those systems of which I have 
direct personal experience - though not, I should add, of 
the Scottish system in the early nineteenth century. It is, 
however, timely to look at the American system and, in 
particular the system of civil appeals. Many aspects of the 
American system are different to that in England, Wales and 
Scotland including, for example, the use of law clerks and 
central staff attorneys, and this is despite the English 
heritage of the American legal system. 
35. As early as the mid nineteenth century time limits were 
-
imposed on oral argument in the Supreme Court, the first 
time limit being one of 2~ hours per side. Since then a 
number of steps have been taken to limit further all 
argument and to shorten the written briefs which were also 
provided. This has led judges to rely primarily on the 
briefs with oral argument as a supplement. The brief 
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follows a format specified in appellate rules and is limited 
in length, usually I understand to about 50 pages. It 
consists of 5 major sections: a statement of issues, a 
statement of the case, a statement of facts, argument and 
conclusion. It is interesting to note that courts have felt 
it necessary to try and regulate the length of briefs 
submitted to them. The use of the word brief in this 
context implies a certain conciseness. I have evidence that 
this is not always the case from a footnote to a report of 
a case in one of the district courts of Wisconsin in 1980 
when the Judge said: 
"The story of the creation of the world is told in the 
book of Genesis in 400 words; the world's greatest 
moral code, the Ten Commandments, contains only 279 
words; Lincoln's Immortal Gettysburg address is but 266 
words in length; the Declaration of Independence 
required only 1321 words to establish for the world a 
new concept of freedom. Together the four contain a 
mere 2266 words. On this routine motion to amend a 
civil complaint, [Counsel] has filed a brief (not the 
primary one, just a reply brief) that contains 
approximately 41596 words spread over an agonizing 124 
pages. In this case, the term reply "brief" is 
obvio'..lsly a misnomer. Rather than impressive, the 
"brief" is oppressive. It points to the need for 
considering the adoption of a local rule limiting the 
... 
-
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number of pages Counsel may fill with written argument 
~· on pre-trial motions." 
36. I would not like to finish this necessarily brief summary 
of the use of written advocacy without referring in passing 
to the one instance I know of in which a written brief in 
the American style was used in England. This was the case 
,;.. : of Randel -v- Worsley in which Professor Michael Zander 
played a significant part. He acted for Randel and as a 
solicitor with no rights of audience in the higher courts, 
produced a written brief in the American style. This was 
reluctantly accepted by the Presiding Judge but not regarded 
as a precedent for future cases. 
ORAL OR WRITTEN 
37. Despite what I have said above the use of Oral Advocacy 
remains a strong and essential part of the systems of 
criminal and civil justice in all the jurisdictions to which 
I have referred. Clearly this is more so in England, Wales 
and Scotland than in the United States, but I do not think 
anyone would deny the potential significance of oral 
argument as a supplement to written briefs, as much as of 
incisive and powerful oral argument on its own. In the 
English and Scottish courts, both crininal and civil, first 
instance and appeal, the success or failure of a case 
depends largely on the strength of the advocacy before it. 
Indeed in some continental systems, steps have been taken 
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to reintroduce oral argument, in recognition of its utility 
~'i in questioning the substance of a case and testing the 
"''"; ~I ~ arguments. 
~ 
38. Well, ladies and Gentlemen, I have set before you a summary 
of the facts. But, it is possible to judge from this which 
of the two styles of advocacy is best? Best for what and 
against what criteria can we judge? I suspect a survey here 
might well come up with at least as many shades of opinion 
as I came across in my research for this lecture. Clearly 
the experience of our two jurisdictions is different, but 
there is no clear uniformity of opinion within either. 
Certainly, pressures of time and resources have made us all 
consider carefully how we manage the work of our courts, and 
I see little prospect of such pressure abating. 
39. My own most recent experience as a Judge lies in the House 
of Lords, the highest Appeal Court in our legal system. 
Again there is no clear uniformity of opinion but a number 
of my colleagues have come to the conclusion that our 
appellate oral advocacy, at least, is too lengthy and too 
diffuse. Some of the fault here may lie with the judges : 
it is sometimes difficult to resist the temptation to 
intervene during the course of the oral argument. There is, 
however, a tendency among some counsel to take an 
insufficiently disciplined approach and to take up a number 
of points of little apparent relevance to their arguments. 
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40. As a result of these concerns we are in the process of 
consulting those most closely involved on possible changes 
to procedure. These include the replacement of the 
appellant's and respondent's cases with a single Statement 
of Facts and Issues and setting down the appeal when the 
Statement is lodged. But, perhaps, most important is the 
requirement that within 7 days of the setting down of the 
appeal each side will notify the Judicial Office of the 
time, in hours, which counsel consider necessary for each 
address which it is proposed should be made on behalf of the 
party. In normal circumstances Counsel will be expected to 
confine the length of the submissions to the time indicated 
in the estimates. It is to be hoped that this will have the 
desired effect, and that my noble colleague Lord Templeman 
will not have cause to repeat his remarks, which could apply 
either to oral or written advocacy in Banque Keyser Ullman 
S.A. -v- Skandiae (UK) Insurance Co in August 1990. He 
said: 
"Before parting with this appeal I draw attention again 
to the length and complexity of the proceedings as they 
appear from the chronological account given earlier in 
this speech. As early as 1961 in an appeal which 
lasted 16 days Donovan L.J. recorded "That the 
questions in this case, one of fact, and four of the 
construction of the contract, have been resolved with 
the aid of only 55 authorities; " Reardon Smith Line Ltd 
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-v- Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (1962] 
1 Q.B. 42, 131. In J H Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd 
-v- Department of Trade and Industry (1989] 3 W.L.R. 
969, 986, I complained of an appeal to this House which 
occupied 26 days and for which copies of 200 
authorities were available. I commented that the vast 
amount of written and oral material tended to obscure 
three fundamental principles decisive of the 
International Tin Council litigation. 
Proceedings in which all or some of the litigants 
indulge in over-elaboration cause difficulties to 
judges at all levels in the achievement of a just 
result. Such proceedings obstruct the hearing of other 
litigation. A litigant faced with expense and delay 
on the part of his opponent which threatened to rival 
the excesses of Jarndyce -v- Jarndyce must perforce 
compromise or withdraw with a real grievance. In the 
present case the burdens placed on Steyn J. and the 
Court of Appeal were very great. The problems were 
complex but the resolution of these problems was not 
assisted by the length of the hearing or the complexity 
of the oral evidence and oral argument. The costs must 
be formidable. I have no doubt that every effort was 
made in the courts below to alleviate the ordeal but 
the history of these proceedings is disquieting. The 
present practice is to allow every litigant unlimited 
time and unlimited scope so that the litigant and his 
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advisers are able to conduct their case in all respects 
in the way which seems best to them. The results not 
infrequently are torrents of words, written and oral, 
which are oppressive and which the judge must examine 
in an attempt to eliminate everything which is not 
relevant, helpful and persuasive. The remedy lies in 
the judge taking time to read in advance pleadings, 
documents certified by counsel to be necessary, proofs 
of witnesses certified by counsel to be necessary, and 
short skeleton arguments of counsel, and for the judge 
then, after a short discussion in open court, to limit 
the time and scope of oral evidence and the time and 
scope of oral argument. The appellate courts should 
be unwilling to entertain complaints concerning the 
results of this practice." 
41. As an advocate, I had personal experience of appearing 
before a Court which discouraged lengthy oral argument - the 
European Court of Justice in Luxembourg. I know that the 
nineteenth John F Sennett lecture was given by the President 
of that Court, Ole Due, and you may therefore already be 
familiar with its practices and procedures. The usual 
practice is for the court to invite the advocates appearing 
before it to indicate the length of time they will require 
to present their case. On one occasion when I appeared 
before the court representing Her Majesty's Government my 
I j opponent was asked how long he would take. His reply of one and half hours caus·ed the court visible surprise. In the 
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event, and no doubt discouraged by the courteous but firm 
reaction to which I have referred, he easily accomplished 
his task in twenty minutes. Certainly, I am not aware that 
the generality of the advocates appearing before that Court 
find the time limits inadequate, particularly as the time 
limits are not fixed by any general rule but in an informal 
discussion before the oral hearing begins. The limits thus 
agreed upon are for the advocates' speeches and further time 
is often taken up by the judges' questions. 
42. I do not think, however, that there would be a great deal 
of enthusiasm amongst my British colleagues for moving to 
your system in the appellate courts of restricting oral 
argument to fifteen to thirty minutes. The restriction can 
only work if judges devote a considerable amount of time to 
pre-reading material in advance of hearing a case as Rule 
44 of the United States Supreme Courts has it :-
"Oral argument should undertake to emphasize and 
clarify the written argument appearing in the briefs 
theretofore filed." 
43. Certainly this is not universally welcomed in other 
jurisdictions where it has been introduced. Professor Ian 
Scott has told me that when he was doing some work for the 
Family Court of Australia, some of the judges told him that 
they resented having to pre-read vast amounts of material 
relating to listed cases when, in the event, the majority 
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of them would settle. They also felt that, because they 
were dealing with a number of rather similar family 
disputes, pre-reading increased the danger that they would 
start to get the issues of one case confused with another. 
Such reservations are, I am sure, not confined to the 
Australians. Indeed, during the preparation of this 
lecture, my attention was drawn to a book called "Justice 
on Appeal" by Carrington, Meedor and Rosenberg. In a 
section on improving the efficiency of the American 
appellate courts they regret the restriction of oral 
argument. I quote: 
"Oral argument gives important service to the 
imperative of appellate justice. Specifically, it 
heightens the judges' sense of personal responsibility. 
It provides them with an opportunity to test their own 
thinking in a direct way with counsel available to 
correct error. Some judges assimilate ideas more 
readily by oral than by written transmission; and some 
ideas are more readily transmitted by oral means. 
Thus, the quality of decisions is likely to be 
enhanced." 
The authors do recognise that listening to oral argument can 
be time-consuming, but they do not regard such time as 
wasted. They go on to suggest that parties should perhaps 
be given the opportunity of waiving the right to oral 
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.argument in certain circumstances. This might save 
genuinely wasted time. Indeed, I think, it is important to 
recognise that time can be wasted in any form of advocacy. 
~ The substance of the case should be the indicator and 
arbitrary time limits of any kind may not be wise. 
46. The question I posed myself at the beginning of this lecture 
was "The Advocate : Should he Speak or Write. " It will 
perhaps not surprise you, if I say that my conclusion is 
that I, at least, cannot arrive at a universal answer to 
this question. I believe that the increase in the workload 
of all our courts is unlikely to diminish. And that, 
against a background of finite resources, we must 
continually reexamine the way in which our systems operate 
with a view to securing greater efficiency and 
effectiveness, whilst maintaining or improving the quality 
of decision making. This may well accentuate the trend 
toward wider use of written material in England and Wales, 
but I am sure that it will not, and should not, lead to the 
exclusion of oral advocacy. I believe that each has an 
important role to play in any system. And certainly for the 
systems with which I am most familiar, I would not like to 
see the introduction of fixed time limits for oral advocacy. 
Any limit should be adjusted to the circumstances of the 
particular case. The exact balance between oral and written 
advocacy will depend on many factors: the nature of the 
system, its historical development and its rules; the nature 
of the proceedings in question and on the training and 
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experience of the advocate himself. [William Cowper has 
it that "Variety's the spice of life, that gives it all is 
flavour". Whilst proceedings in our courts are not dull, 
too rigid prescription of styles of advocacy might cause 
them to became so] 
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